(Disclaimer: this post is about a base check, done in a flight simulator for the purpose of pilot training)
The first day.
It was a rainy day in JOG / WARJ (Jogjakarta). MH 856 was about to depart for KUL with ZFW of 49 tonnes. At the prevailing temperature and QNH, with minimum fuel I barely made the maximum takeoff weight, and that is for runway 27 and flap 15. Even with 5 kt headwind for runway 09 the max takeoff weight was below the planned ZFW + minimum fuel, so no choice, really.
After airborne suddenly the GPWS goes "terrain, terrain" so I took evasive action, press TOGA and pull the nose up. Clear of the terrain there was another problem: a military traffic was ahead, slightly below and climbing. Suddenly the TCAS shouted "pull up" which means once again I had to take evasive action while my FO communicates with the ATC. Clear of the conflict I check with the cabin, no injury so we continue with the flight.
Reaching cruise altitude of FL320 we settle down for the flight. Suddenly the master caution lights up. The right aircond pack is having problem. We carried out the non-normal checklist but the problem persists. We end up shutting down the right pack. We are now down to a single pack operation but since the pressurization are maintained, we elect to stay at FL320.
Soon we have another problem. Now the left bleed was having problem. Once again the NNC was carried out, but here is the catch: it calls for shutting down the left bleed and pack, but if we shut down the left pack we'll be unpressurized. And at FL320 if you become unpressurized you'll have to do emergency descend quickly, or else hypoxia will take over. It will be another Helios.
But wait. On the right side we have pack problem. On the left we have bleed problem. The solution? Use the right bleed to power up the left pack. problem averted.
Chugging along past Jakarta, another problem comes along. One of the CSD had high oil temperature. Once again, the NNC. It calls for the CSD to be disconnected. Therefore for another source of electricity we had to start up the APU. Too bad, as soon as it was started the APU had a fault condition. NNC again, and the APU had to be shut down.
With only a single source of electrics remaining, the only thing to do was to land at the nearest suitable airport. Our location was such that CGK / WIII (Jakarta) was the nearest so after checking the weather and finding that it was suitable, we decided to divert there. No problem except while on approach to runway 25L in CGK there was some windshear and strong tailwind; I ended up having to carry out a missed approach and come again on a visual circuit.
Landing was uneventful except just before I turn off the runway the nosewheel collapsed. Do I need to evacuate? Evacuation is not a risk-free action after all, after checking with tower that there is no fire or immediate danger, I decided not to evacuate but disembark using the stairs instead.
Day 2At JOG again. Again, another heavy takeoff with strong crosswind. Flap 15, runway 09.
My first attempt to takeoff, I was approaching V1 when my FO calls "Engine Failure". Feels the aircraft veers to the right. I calls "Abort", close the thrust levers, disengaged the autothrottles, deploy the speedbrakes and maximum braking. Managed to have aircraft under control and stop before the end of the runway.
2nd attempt. This time the engines were fine, up to V1 at least. There was about 10 kt difference between V1 and Vr, and that is when the left engine fails. Too late to abort, I have to continue the takeoff. Aircraft managed to climb but very slowly; the right engine is not giving any thrust at all. As previously discussed for engine failure procedures, we followed the escape route. At 6.7 DME to JOG VOR, we turn to a left heading of 225. This escape route will bring us away from the high terrains around the airport and bring us over the sea. It took the eternity to get to 600 ft RA, where the engine failure recognition was carried out. Yes, the right engine has seized. So we shut it down, using the NNC as the guide.
Check out he weather at JOG, it was marginal. Plus the glide slope was unserviceable. But we didn't have much choice; we climbed to 4000 ft and join the holding pattern at 8.0 DME JOG, radial 276. We carried out the checklist applicable for a single engine landing. Ready, we carried out the LOC DME approach for runway 09.
The rain must be getting heavier because as we descend towards MDA, nothing can be seen outside. At the MDA of 750 ft, still nothing so a missed approach was carried out. A single engine missed approach. At 1500 ft we turn left, head towards the JOG VOR, and from there proceed to the 8 DME holding fix again. Again, more checklists. Entering the holding pattern, we were told by ATC that the weather was improving and the glideslope was serviceable again. So we carried out the ILS approach. I sighted he runway just above minima so the single engine landing was carried out successfully.
So we were back at Yogyakarta again, and then it was my first officer's turn to go through all those all over again.
Between June and December of this year, all B734 pilots flying for Malaysia Airlines will go through the same situation at JOG. Most will make it.
And I will have to go through something similar every 6 months for the rest of my career.
